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1. Introduction 
 
This paper analyses the relationship between Iranian Millennials − the term ‘Millen-
nials’ defines women and men born between early 1980s and late 1990s − and feminism. 
We will try to understand what the main characteristics of Millennial feminism in Iran 
are, what do Millennial women and men think about feminism, whether or not they con-
sider themselves feminists or in favor of gender equality and whether they think femi-
nism is still necessary. We will also discuss how their engagement with women’s rights 
is changing, that is, how Millennials’ distinctive sociohistorical experience differentiates 
them from previous generations of citizens and activists. Specifically, we will focus on 
Millennials women and men born in the 1990s and belonging to the urban middle class 
of Tehran. Millennials are one of the most substantial social groups in Iran: youths born 
after 1979 constitute about 60% of the over 83 million inhabitants of the Islamic Repub-
lic, contributing to meaningfully lower the national median age (currently 32 years – 
Worldometer 2020a). Thus, understanding their attitudes and values is crucial to better 
appreciate social processes and the different ways in which, today, feminism(s) de-
velop(s) in contexts other that the Western one.  
The history of feminism in Iran is complex and controversial. The concept itself has 
taken many forms over the centuries and in relation to historical and political contingen-
cies, but it has mostly been received with mistrust, if not open hostility, by the authori-
ties both before and after the 1979 revolution. It is not surprising, thus, that the femi-
nism of Millennials is a subject of continued debate as well, in Iran as well as in other 
contexts outside the country (Maurer 2016). The popular stereotypes have defined this 
generation as selfish, narcissistic and politically disengaged; more generally, Iranian 
youth are often associated with political apathy (Ahmadi Khorasani 2017; Rahbari 2019), 
while some authors have underlined their lack of a clear ideological framework (Dabashi 
2000; Khosravi 2017; Sarraf et al., 2017; Bagheri 2018; Morgana 2018b). Indeed, disaffil-
iation from official institutions and the transition towards a fragmented, individualized 
type of activism constitutes a widespread phenomenon among the young people in sev-
eral geographical and political settings (Farthing 2010; Camozzi, Cherubini, Leccardi and 
Rivetti 2015).  
While we acknowledge some of these viewpoints, our starting point is similar to the 
one expressed by different scholars (Kurzman 2008; Chittal 2015; Milkman 2017; Winch 
2017): Millennials constitute a new political generation. Our field research proves these 
youths are anything but uninterested in political and social debates; on the contrary, 
when it comes to discuss politics, gender issues and current events, they seem to have 
much to say and often express clear positions. Moreover, widespread connectivity gives 
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the new generations access to global events and crises, which, for example, led to mil-
lions of young people marching to demand action be taken to address climate change. 
In the last decade, also in Iran, despite the political aversion and the lack of proper do-
mestic debate, it is possible to notice the rise of a new gender-conscious generation of 
young women and men (Kurzman 2008). Indeed, young people (and particularly young 
women) are significantly more likely to espouse feminist attitudes and views than other 
Iranians (Kurzman 2008). Despite their privileged social and economic background, how-
ever, the youths considered by this research are not immune from ambiguities and even 
reactionary positions, particularly manifest among men. If, on the one hand, Millennials' 
activism is changing compared to the past, and their attitude towards feminism is chang-
ing as well, on the other hand they also express contradictions towards feminism, its 
meaning and its practical applications. Indeed, one of our claims is that this apparent 
lack of a homogeneous feminist grammar is part of a global trend, but above all it can be 
traced back to the long-term effort undertaken by the Iranian authorities to repress, 
control and coopt feminism and women’s activism, determining, over time, the plural 
and disaggregated nature of the movement and youths’ disaffiliation.   
Starting off from these considerations, our paper aims to give a contribution to the 
debate on Iranian youths and the cultural and social changes they are experimenting 
also in order to deconstruct common stereotypes that represent young Iranians through 
two opposite and irreconcilable poles: radicalized and backward versus Westernized, 
groundbreaking and defiant (Danesh and Kashefi 2012; Debeljak 2013; Olszewska 2013). 
Furthermore, by focusing on Iranian Millennials we will contribute to overcoming one 
limitation in the existing studies, reports and surveys on Millennials, feminism and gen-
der issues that tend to consider mostly white youth from Western countries, underesti-
mating the experience of migrants, minorities and non-Western youths. The paper is 
composed of two parts.1 Section 2 explains the methodological choices taken in this 
study, while section 3 focuses on the current academic debate on the Millennial gener-
ation within and outside Iran and the peculiarities of this generation’s activism. The sec-
ond part (sections 4 and 5) focuses on the Iranian context. More specifically, these sec-
tions offer an analysis of the complex relation between the Iranian authorities, the con-
cept of feminism and the women’s movement before and after the 1979 revolution, try-
ing to comprehend Millennials’ understanding of feminism and the criticisms they make.  
 
 
 
 
1 The article is the outcome of a joint research. Elisabetta Ruspini wrote the introduction and section 3; Rassa 
Ghaffari sections 2, 4, and 5. Conclusions were written by both authors. 
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2. Methodology  
 
The arguments presented in this paper are based on a literature review on the Mil-
lennial generation and on the history of feminism and women's activism in Iran over the 
last two centuries (see for example: Afary 1996, 2009; Najmabadi 1998, 2005a, 2005b; 
Moallem 2005; Kurzman 2008; Kian-Thiébaut 2012), as well as on interviews with twelve 
Millennial women and twelve Millennial men born in the 1990s and belonging to the 
urban middle class2 of Iran’s capital city. The interviews, collected in Tehran between 
2018 and 2019, were aimed at understanding perceptions of gender roles among young 
women and men and to collect their opinion on a number of issues such as feminism, 
patriarchy and gender relations, also in order to assess the presence of a shared view 
and bring out potential contradictions. Reporting their own narratives and thoughts is of 
crucial relevance as one of our goals is to dismantle some hegemonic discourses that 
incorporate and standardize Iranian youths’ experience into homogeneous macro cate-
gories (Olszewska 2013; Khosravi 2017).  
The type of interview chosen is the narrative interview elaborated by Fritz Schütze 
(1983, 1984). The purpose of this technique is to recollect personal stories, experiences 
and subjective elaborations from the standpoint of the participant. It is an in-depth and 
not standardized interview in which individuals are encouraged to build a spontaneous 
narration. The dialogue is not structured by the scholar; instead, the interviewees are 
left free to build their own systems of relevance (Leccardi 2000; Magaraggia 2015).  
The participants were either current or former university students with a completed 
higher education degree and were selected using non-probabilistic sampling methods. 
Albeit we recognize that the relatively small number of interviews precludes any abso-
lute conclusions about Iranian youths, we believe that the opinions expressed are helpful 
to understand these young people's views of feminism, also because they indicate a rel-
ative convergence of opinions and beliefs. 
The research focuses on the middle-class youths of Tehran. Today, Tehran and its 
metropolitan area include nearly one quarter of the country’s total population (over 83 
million people): more than 7 million people live in the city (Worldometer 2020b) and 15 
million in the larger metropolitan area of Greater Tehran. Since its foundation, Tehran 
has been the most cosmopolitan city in Iran, from which the greatest part of the political 
 
2 According to Kian-Thiébaut, the particular distinguishing feature that differentiates members of the mod-
ern middle class from other social groups is their possession of cultural competence and capital. With a 
background in higher education, this group consists of salaried employees in the public and private sectors 
and the liberal professions. Thus, it includes among others, teachers, doctors, lawyers, engineers, army of-
ficers, journalists, writers and university students, etc. (Kian-Thiébaut 2012).  
Ghaffari and Ruspini, Locating Feminism Beyond the Western Context. The Iranian Case 
 
669 
 
and social influences and movements have originated and propagated to the rest of the 
country. As well as being Iran’s political capital, the city is also its beating cultural and 
economic heart. Consequently, its middle class has historically defined, more than other 
groups, the cultural, political and economic traits that prevail in society and has been the 
main protagonist of social movements and political activism (Harris 2012; Sreberny-
Mohammadi and Massoumeh 2013; Bagheri 2018). 
 
 
3. The Iranian Millennial Generation: Global Forces, Local Lives 
 
The historical, cultural, political and economic environment in which each genera-
tion grows up during its formation years impacts its values, attitudes, interests and be-
haviors (Mannheim 1928; Pilcher 1994; Gilleard 2004; Wyn and Woodman 2006). This 
conceptualization of a ‘generation’ is rooted in Mannheim’s (1928) theory that recog-
nizes the implication that events have on individuals/groups within a specific context. In 
Mannheim’s view, a generation is not only a birth cohort: is a social entity, members of 
which have a certain ‘bond’ and ‘generational consciousness’ due to sharing a common 
place in history. Social and historical events (especially if they occur during the ‘forma-
tive’ period, i.e. during adolescence) may determine a whole generation’s capacity for 
cultural elaboration, stimulate a common world view and, consequently, encourage the 
development of the consciousness of being a sociocultural group. According to Strauss 
and Howe, “the year in which a person is born and the year in which he/she comes to 
age” as well as “the last, fundamental event in the collective memory of a society oc-
curred before the birth of the oldest members of that cohort”, are important in defining 
the common age location of a generation (Strauss and Howe 1991, 65). 
Currently, there is no consensus about how to precisely define Millennials: the exact 
dates of the generation vary among researchers. Moreover, scholars have warned 
against the attempt to make generalizations about an entire generation (Furstenberg 
2017). If, on the one hand, it is not at all easy to define a whole generation, on the other 
hand Millennials are different in many ways from earlier generations due to their specific 
socio-historical location (Mannheim 1928; Gilleard 2004; Wyn and Woodman 2006; 
Pilcher 2016). Millennials have been shaped, more than the previous generations, by the 
interactions between global and local/national events. Unlike their parents, they have 
worldwide simultaneously experienced massive technological change and the challenges 
posed by globalization, including increasing interconnectedness between countries and 
cultures, unequal economic development and a growing sense of insecurity over the 
present and the future. The – 1990s – a central period for Millennials’ formative 
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experience – was characterised by the rise of multiculturalism and the growing im-
portance of ICT.  
The tension between global and local forces is also a defining characteristic of Iranian 
Millennials. Their most important feature is unquestionably not having experienced 
firsthand the 1979 revolution; at the same time, they have grown during the post-war 
reconstruction, in the midst of profound political and social reforms and the advance-
ment of new and emerging technologies that have radically changed the way people 
interact and communicate (Khosravi 2017). Thus, it is not surprising that their forms of 
activism and citizenship differ from those of previous generations. There are however 
relevant differences among the various post-revolutionary cohorts that lie in the dissim-
ilar political, economic and social context in which they have grown. While the so-called 
‘daheye shasti-ha’3 were born in a decade saturated by the pervasive ethics of sacrifice, 
martyrdom, the aesthetics of modesty advocated by the government, the survival econ-
omy and the scarcity of primary goods (Khosravi 2017), the 1990s were marked by eco-
nomic growth, market liberalization, technological progress and a new consumerist logic 
resulting from the ongoing capitalization and globalization process (Sohrab Zadeh 2009). 
As Rivetti (2020) points out, some scholars have defined those years as ‘the era of dis-
traction’ (Saghafi 1994; Adelkhah 1998), characterized by a depoliticization of the public 
and the youths, grown up more attracted by consumption than by politics, while others 
(Siamdoust 2016) have highlighted the new opportunities to socialize and make politics 
emerged in that period. Young people born in the 1990s have no direct experience of 
the conflict nor of the political, social and civic activism of the reformist period of 
Khatami. Most of them were too young to actively participate in the 1999 and 2009 pro-
tests and, according to Morgana (2018b), it is not risky to assume that they would have 
decided not to do it.  
Indeed, literature explains that one of their most interesting features is the apparent 
lack of a coherent ideological framework and strong landmarks. According to Dabashi, 
for example, they have developed a post-ideological character in response and opposi-
tion to the highly politicized and ideological nature of the revolution and the generation 
that lived it (Dabashi 2000). Azadarmaki (2010) uses the expressions ‘uncertain’, ‘anon-
ymous’ and ‘devoted to pastime’ to designate the new post-revolutionary cohorts whose 
main feature would be precisely the absence of commitment to social issues, which rep-
resented instead the dominant feature of the previous generations. In Iran, Millennials 
 
3 Literally, ‘those of the 1960s’, meaning individuals born in the 1980s in the Gregorian calendars.  
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have been labelled by many analysts and by part of the population itself4 as passive, 
devoid of ideologies and social involvement (Azadarmaki 2010; Khosravi 2017), a gener-
ation “who postpones social activism to do the manicure” (Ahmadi Khorasani 2018, 1). 
Morgana (2018b) notices their radically different approach towards politics and active 
engagement, highlighting their discharge of official ideologies and collective action.  
These analyses seem consistent with the international literature on Millennials’ in-
volvement in social activism and feminism. Several studies (Buschman and Lenart 1996; 
Maurer 2016; Genforward 2018) underline that progress in gender equality seems to 
have led some Millennials to dismiss the feminist movement: they seem to support 
women’s rights and gender equality but do not identify as ‘feminists’. This apparent ab-
sence of a homogeneous and coherent engagement in feminism among Millennials is a 
highly debated issue in the sociological literature (Williams and Wittig 1997; Myaskovsky 
and Wittig 1997; Liss, O’Connor, Morosky and Crawford 2001; Crossley 2017). As our 
research shows, these tensions and contradictions persist among Iranian middle-class 
Millennials, as well. Nevertheless, this does not mean this generation does not engage 
in activism at all and does not even mean that it has not developed a political conscious-
ness yet. Bayat defines Iranian youth as a ‘social category’, an essentially modern, mostly 
urban, phenomenon that experiences and develops a particular self-consciousness that 
connects them as young people to contextual politics and makes them ‘transformative 
agents,’ with a potential to rebel against the existing structures (Bayat 2017). These 
agents are described as a group of largely well-educated youth who are increasingly con-
nected through cyber technologies to each other and to transnational cyberspace. Ac-
cording to some opinions (Moallem 2011), in Iran, also because of the political re-
strictions in public spaces, technology has functioned as a major site of social negotia-
tions, cultural discussions and political interventions: social media and ICT are expanding 
the notions of both cultural and political citizenship. 
In the last decade, in fact, activism for women’s rights seems to have assumed inno-
vative shapes and strategies (Hoodfar and Sadr 2010; Sadeghi 2010). Although they have 
frequently been accused of being de-ideologized and of not participating in the political 
and social life of the country, Millennials’ role has proved to be crucial in the develop-
ment of new forms of political expression and struggle (Morgana 2018a). The recent se-
ries of protests against compulsory hijab arose since 2017 is a fitting example of the 
changing aims, tools and modalities at the basis of women’s rights activism and the al-
ternative forms of political strategies implemented by this generation. The protests were 
 
4 This sentence is the outcome of one of the author’s field research in Tehran, where extensive interviews 
with men and women of different generations revealed a widespread scepticism about youths’ activism, 
interest and role in current political and social events.  
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inspired by a 30-year-old woman called Vida Movahed. On 27 December 2017 she took 
off her headscarf, tied it to a stick and waved it silently as a flag, while standing in the 
crowd atop a utility box on Tehran’s Enghelab Street (Revolution Street). Her act of civil 
disobedience was recorded and widely disseminated on social media, prompting other 
Iranian women to stage similar public protests and express their desire for individual 
freedom and personal autonomy. These women are described as the ‘Girls of Enghelab 
Street’. Since then, a growing number of women, above all young girls, have begun to 
replicate the gesture and share it on social networks. Although there are documented 
cases of women acting together, most of them are portrayed alone. 
Demonstrations against the compulsory veil have marked the history of the Islamic 
Republic since its birth. One of the elements that differ in the latest protests is the inno-
vative, effective use of new media and virtual spaces along with social networking such 
as Instagram and Telegram that have been major elements in the success of the phe-
nomenon. This form of dissent and the most recent news about women’s activism − such 
as the protests against the imprisonment of a teenager accused of spreading subversive 
contents on Instagram, or the demonstrations against the stadium ban − show that 
young people's current social participation mainly takes place directly and primarily 
through social media platforms. Ahmadi Khorasani (2018) identifies the young women 
involved in the ‘Girls of Enghelab Street’ (non)movement as a ‘new generation of social 
activists’ different not only from the revolutionary generation, but also from those who 
lived the 2009 protests. The intense use of social media and the individualistic, direct 
and transitory nature of their protests make it difficult for older generations to under-
stand Millennials' political engagement and activism. While the previous generations are 
accustomed to a form of common protest that resorted primarily to face-to-face meet-
ings and collective agencies such as newspapers, organizations or NGOs, today the dis-
sent occurs autonomously and instantaneously, without a coordinated organization, of-
ten individually5, and is driven by a multiplicity of stances these youths feel relevant for 
their personal, everyday life (Sadeghi 2008; Hoodfar and Sadeghi 2009). The advent of 
new communication tools liberated more room for non-institutional activism and online 
feminism through social media such as Instagram and Twitter. As a consequence, these 
dynamics have de-centralised gender activism (Norton et al. 1997; Le Renard 2014; 
Camozzi, Cherubini, Leccardi and Rivetti 2015). As Melucci (1996) points out, social 
movements in the so-called ‘Information Age’ are often categorized as fragmented and 
heterogeneous, assume dynamic forms of collective action and are continually 
 
5 Already in 2004, Mahdi noticed a greater individualism in the Iranian women’s activism than had existed 
any time before in the past century, and linked this attitude to the globalization forces of modernity (Mahdi 
2004).  
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reconstructed through diffused, decentralized and subterranean networks (Hoodfar and 
Sadeghi 2009).  
To better comprehend this development, the following section recalls the develop-
ment of the Iranian women’s movement struggle with the State throughout the last 60 
years.  
 
 
4. The Iranian State and Feminism: A Century-Long Battle for Hegemony   
The development of the concept of feminism in Iran is understandable as continuous 
back-and-forth exchanges and dialogues between foreign ─ and mainly Western ─ influ-
ences, ideas and inspirations and Iran’s own trajectory and peculiarities (Tohidi 2002). 
The relation between the Iranian State and feminism has developed over the decades 
through a combination of repressive tactics and partial openings in the face of the inces-
sant female activism. Thus, the aim of this section is to analyze the historical roots of the 
State’s anti-feminist formulation both during the Pahlavi monarchy and the Islamic Re-
public and the attempts to face, alter and ultimately suppress feminist politics and in-
volvement. This will help us to better understand some of the contradictions emerged 
from the interviews and is related to two of our main arguments: the apparent lack of a 
coherent and univocal feminist grammar among Tehran’s middle-class Millennials and 
their ambivalence towards the native/Western forms of feminism.   
Both the Pahlavi monarchy and the Islamic Republic have employed legal and politi-
cal discourses designed to incorporate women's rights and requests as either secular, 
modern and Westernized or, alternatively, as Islamic and anti-imperialist (Naghibi 2006). 
The Pahlavi’s era (1925-1979) witnessed the growth of women’s organizations whose 
demands and requests, however, found echoes only when they matched the govern-
ment’s goals and ideals. Women’s rights continued to be used as political tools in the 
power confrontation between the modernizing regime and conservative religious lead-
ers (Hoodfar and Sadr 2010). At that time, the discourses of feminism, nationalism and 
modernity were exploited by Western movements and Iranian elites to argue in favor of 
the emancipation of the Iranian woman, who would thereby assist in the development 
of the country's nationalist goals (Naghibi 2006). If the years following Reza Shah’s abdi-
cation (1941) had seen the proliferation of organizations such as the Women’s League, 
the Women's Party and the Center for Ladies sponsored by Mohammad Reza’s sister, 
their effectiveness and autonomy were gradually subordinated to more relevant political 
parties and were anyway under governmental control (Naghibi 2006; Eskamani 2011; 
Afary 2012). In what Saranarian (1982) defined the ‘co-optation and legitimation’ period 
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of the women’s movement, these organizations promoted activities designed to both 
depoliticize the women’s activism and shape their involvement and participation as a 
sign of modernity, the latter being a key concern of the Shah (Mahdi 2004). Although it 
officially aimed to improve the women’s status by aligning it with Western standards, 
this ‘State feminism’ was realized without much grass roots participation by women’s 
groups and popular political organizations; actually, it hindered full female empower-
ment and failed to fully achieve its goals. Mohammad Reza Shah’s statements over the 
years proved he was not a feminist, but he was convinced that women’s education and 
greater participation in the labor force were “economically beneficial and would contrib-
ute to his modern image” (Afary 2009, 38). 
The manipulation and control of women's social identities, appearance and activism 
remained a powerful political strategy also after the overthrow of the Shah. If the mon-
archy promoted an image of feminism as a wholly Western phenomenon divorced from 
Iranian cultural traditions, the Islamic Republic reversed this trend by forcing women:  
“To choose allegiances, but again it was a spurious choice since to declare oneself 
a feminist was to declare oneself a member of the 'counter-revolutionary' West-
ernized elite who were purportedly at the root of all the nation's problems” (Nagh-
ibi 2006, 567).  
Much like the Pahlavi monarchy, the Islamic ruling class implemented immediately 
multiple strategies to appropriate the feminist ideology and to fragment women’s or-
ganization. Instances of this logic were the decision to celebrate the Women’s Day in 
coincidence with the birthday of Fatemeh, the Prophet's daughter6, the expulsion in 
1979 of the well-known feminist Kate Millet, identified as the symbol of Western impe-
rialism, and the mobilization of Islamic associations against the spontaneous women's 
protests (Paidar 1999). Perceiving women’s demands as a political challenge and a pro-
vocative issue, the State appointed itself as the patron of women’s rights and major 
source of social change in their status (Mahdi 2004). For the authorities (and many po-
litical parties), feminism and women’s protests posed a danger to the revolutionary front 
and questioned the legitimacy of the new system. As women had been targeted the 
markers of the new national and Islamic identity, feminism constituted a foreign inter-
ference to be stifled (Hoodfar and Sadr 2010). Feminism was supposed to distract 
women from their primary responsibilities (social reproduction, housework and family 
 
6 Depicted as a dutiful daughter, mother and wife, Fatemeh was celebrated as the correct role-model for 
Iranian women and an invitation for them to actively participate in the Iranian revolution under the aegis 
of the Islamic faction (Paidar 1999; Fazaeli 2017).  
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care) and to destabilize the Islamic order; it was labelled ‘bourgeois’ and therefore “di-
visionary in the nation’s fight against the Shah and his Western supporters” (McElrone 
2005, 316).  
Since its foundation, hence, the Islamic Republic has carried on a coherent cultural 
discourse aimed at demonizing feminist goals and ideals (Afary 2009). Though, policies 
towards women did not take root through force alone: trying to repress and take control 
of their activism, the State simultaneously encouraged the more secluded women to be-
come politically active in support of the Islamic cause. Inviting women to become dy-
namic citizens in the new order, Khomeini opened up new spaces previously closed to 
them; in return, he asked hostility to those categories (e.g. leftist and feminist women) 
that were not aligned (Afary 2009). These efforts resulted in the hardline clergy’s initial 
success to undermine women’s protests and the failure of female organizations to safe-
guard women’s rights with the full institutionalization of the Islamic State (Paidar 1999). 
Until the 1990s and 2000s, indeed, the front of the so-called Islamic and secular feminists 
has remained divided, if not openly hostile (Paidar 1995; Najmabadi 1998). Under 
Khatami’s administration (1997-2005), alarmed by the unexpected and massive exodus 
of votes towards the reformist front, conservatives decided to resort again to the 
women’s mobilization reviving the volunteer Basij, encouraging women to get involved 
and pushing traditional parties to activate women for local elections (Hoodfar and Sadr 
2010). After Ahmadinejad’s appointment in 2005, policies have been aimed to undo the 
reforms women had succeeded to bring about over two decades, which authorities be-
littled as ‘creeping secularization’ and ‘Westernization’ (Hoodfar and Sadr 2010). Given 
that feminist ideology was accused of playing a central role in politicizing women against 
the establishment, the State tried also to integrate those with religious backgrounds into 
its own cultural institutions, albeit in separated spaces (Saeidi 2011). 
Since 2009, the islamization of women’s rights and identities has changed partially 
compared to other periods of the Islamic Republic’s history (Saeidi 2011). If until the 
1990s the State adopted a rather explicit endeavor including the curtailment of women’s 
public presence and their forced restriction into the private sphere, other tactics have 
been implemented over time including a process of co-option carried out through mul-
tifaced politics (Paidar 1999; Saeidi 2011). In the last decade, the authorities have con-
tinued to alternate imprisonment of activists, closure of women’s NGOs and of hundreds 
of print media outlets with more mild tactics like the announcement, in 2017, to replace 
the arrest of women not respecting the hijab with corrective courses7. These strategies, 
from sticks and carrots to the open resort to violence, are all different forms of 
 
7 Most of the news related to this initiative, however, is limited to the period immediately following the 
arrest of Movahed, and there no longer seems to be any detailed information on its actual implementation.  
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patriarchal State control over women employed to weaken their autonomy and involve-
ment (Fazaeli 2017).  
The women’s movement, on the other hand, has been able to undertake in turn a 
number of tactics to counterbalance the repression including, as described by Gerami 
and Lehnerer (2001) and Mahdi (2004) collaboration, negotiation, acquiescence, coop-
tation and resistance. As a result, their activism has been forced by the contingencies to 
survive in a constant state of flux (Hoodfar and Sadeghi 2009) and become many-headed 
and uncoordinated, persuading some authors to claim the absence of a proper women’s 
social movement (Mahdi 2004; Hoodfar and Sadeghi 2009; Bayat 2010). Together with 
the long-term State’s repression, this lack of a homogeneous and coherent organization 
and ideology can be counted among the reasons why feminism and women’s activism 
today struggle to find a wide recognition within the Iranian society. Sadeghi (2010) 
pointed out that after 2009, the women’s movement, despite tremendous efforts, could 
not find acceptance as a platform for action by most Iranians, leading women of dissim-
ilar social backgrounds choose to act individually or according to an entirely different 
political agenda. As mentioned in the previous paragraph, along with class, political ori-
entation and ethnicity, generational differences and a shift in the modes of expression 
and political activism can be considered explanatory factors.  
Moving from these premises, the next section investigates how Tehran’s middle-
class youths born in the 1990s understand, articulate and put into practice the concept 
of feminism through the analysis of their own words and narratives.  
 
5. Iranian Millennials’ Feminism: New Perspectives, View and Challenges 
As for several other social and political issues, feminism is approached with ambiva-
lence8 by Iranian youths. Within Iranian society, the definition conveyed by feminism 
depends on the sympathy of the user, and there is even substantial discrepancy in the 
meaning given to the term, but the most common messages are those of support for 
equality between men and women’s rights and opposition to patriarchy (Tohidi, 2016). 
Generally speaking, the term continues to have a negative connotation in the public 
 
8 According to Khosrokhavar, one of the major characteristics of contemporary youth culture is the ambiva-
lence towards numerous cultural and social questions, understood not as confusion or contradiction, but 
coexistence of multiple models, ideals and different but not necessarily contrasting attitudes (Khosrokhavar 
in Bahramitash and Hooglund 2011, 99). 
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discourse9. While the ruling conservative Islamists deny the existence of such a move-
ment, until recently, both secular and Muslim activists shared a common dismissal of 
feminism as sign of ‘social deviation of Western women’ and ‘Weststruckness’ in the 
wake of an historical trend that has built West and East, and modernism and feminism, 
as exclusionary categories10 (Najmabadi 1998).  
Our field research and literature review confirm the greater openness and awareness 
of the Millennial generation towards the whole of ideals and behaviours generally 
branded as feminism (Debeljak 2013; Kurzman 2008). As their peers worldwide, Iranian 
youths appear to be: 
“More positive toward the participation of women outside the household. These 
new generations are also more open to new experiences and are more willing to 
go beyond traditions. [For them] post-materialist values are the first priority and 
materialist values second, and the reverse for older generations” (Azadarmaki and 
Ghaffari 2008, 30).  
Overall all Millennials interviewed expressed support for equality between women 
and men in political, cultural and social domains, even if some of them refused the label 
of feminism11 and few showed full familiarity with the history of the movement, as ex-
plained by Siamak12, a man of 25: “I think that almost 90% of those I know agree with 
equality between men and women… but only few of them know what feminism means 
and maybe 50% of them practices it in everyday life”13. Indeed, the findings indicate a 
definition gap in identification with feminism that is largely attributable to mainly two 
beliefs: the belief that feminists are extremists and anti-male; and the belief that femi-
nism is predominantly a Western ideology hardly applicable to the Iranian case, which 
has its own needs and requirements.  
 
9 Shahidian (1998), Paidar (2001) and Fazaeli (2017) note that in Iran some of the confusion arises from the 
fact that the term ‘feminism’ does not have a Farsi equivalent and is widely used as a ‘Western import’. 
10 According to Najmabadi (1998), the modernizing policies of the Pahlavi’s monarchy and the Shiite clergy 
constructed each other’s' domains of authority and produced Islam and feminism as mutually exclusive, so 
much so that many continue today to find the category of ‘Islamic feminism’ difficult to imagine, and a ‘fem-
inist Muslim’ a paradoxical identity. Some of the Millennials interviewed confirmed this view, expressing 
their perplexity about the coherence of a Muslim feminist.  
11 Even if it is true that the opinions and behaviours of many of these actors can be considered feminist, they 
do not call themselves feminists and therefore it would be incorrect to use this expression to define them.  
12 The interviewees’ names have been changed to respect their privacy.  
13 All interviews have been translated from Persian into English by Rassa Ghaffari.  
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The first conviction is the promotion of the superiority of women over men and is due 
to a biased understanding of the essence of feminism attributable to a lack of proper 
public debate and organizations in Iran (Shahidian 1994), the longstanding State’s nega-
tive propaganda and a number of significant socioeconomic changes in the society. The 
anti-feminist attitudes of the Islamic Republic contribute casting feminists as anti-male 
fanatics and promoting a variety of negative stereotypes14. Furthermore, women’s con-
siderable achievements in fields such as education, public visibility and employment ap-
pear to constitute a threat to the traditional and hegemonic masculine privileges 
(Najmabadi 2005a; Khosravi 2017). Several young men affirmed that the increasing in-
fluence of Western ideas and models on Iranian women bears controversial effects on 
society. Ramin, a 29-year-old man, as an instance, criticizes Iranian women because they:  
“…Want the same privileges of Western women, like the right to work, along with 
those of traditional women, like the mehrieh15. It does not work like this. Women 
should work and contribute to the domestic life; instead, they stay at home doing 
nothing”.  
The decision to ask for the dowry is presented here as a ‘traditional’ act, in contrast 
to those of the ‘Western women’, bearers of rights and responsibilities that are consid-
ered ‘modern’, like working outside home and sharing family expenses. Caught in con-
tradiction between these opposite stimuli, Iranian women would become increasingly 
demanding and pretentious. This opinion is reaffirmed by Mahdi, another man of 28 who 
describes himself in favour of full equality between men and women: 
“The concept of feminism in Iran still has a negative connotation. I’d rather con-
sider myself an egalitarian. I do not understand why we should call it feminism if 
it is the matter of equality between both genders. But many girls here think it 
means they have more rights than men because of their sex” (emphasis added). 
 
14 In an editorial marking the end of its first year of publication, the feminist journal Zanan (Women) wrote: 
“Misogynous thought has so seeped into the soul of our men that they consider women taking up jobs 
outside the home as rebellion against men and as a sign of lack of commitment to the family” (quoted in 
Najmabadi 1998, 72) 
15 It is an arbitrary payment, in the form of money or possessions paid by the groom to the bride at the time 
of marriage. While it is often money, it can also be anything agreed upon by the bride such as jewellery, 
home goods, furniture, a dwelling or some land. Its amount is typically specified in the marriage contract 
signed by both partners. 
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Declaring he prefers to define himself an egalitarian rather than a feminist, this man 
is actually endorsing the negative label of the term despite his support for the whole 
concept. In his view, besides, feminism’s claims of equality are often exploited by Iranian 
women to obtain privileges and impose themselves upon their partners or peers, a belief 
shared by a large number of interviewees. Another example of the defensive attitude 
many men seem to assume towards feminists was given by a 29-year-old man who, after 
being introduced to one of the authors, commented sarcastically: “Oh, you are a femi-
nist? Please don’t start to judge”. Continuing the conversation, he criticized feminist 
women for “having too many expectations and judging everything”.  
In contrast, Paria, a 28-year-old self-declared feminist expresses her frustration as a 
woman in having to face a widespread mansplaining about what to be a feminist means 
and entails: “It happened to me at a party, I argued with a boy because he stated that 
feminism means the dominance of women over men. It is wrong. It means complete 
equality”. 
Golnar, another woman of 29, affirmed her complete observance of the whole con-
cept of feminism explaining in the meantime that she has been warned against declaring 
herself a feminist because “it is not fashionable, not really interesting”. Apparently, even 
for those who embraces feminism, many felt that the label has become so stigmatized 
that it is difficult to interest their peers in joining a movement and ideology that rally 
around ‘women’s issues’. Most interviewees reported that feminism is unpopular among 
their friends, who turn away from self-identifying as such for fear of being excluded, 
judged or mocked (Maurer 2016), but also because they do not see the need to join a 
movement to express their beliefs. 
Millennials are extensively considered the engine of a profound change taking place 
in the society which presents its own contradictions and takes different forms for men 
and women (Shaditalab 2005; Azadarmaki and Ghaffari 2008; Kurzman 2008). Yet, they 
cannot be considered free from oxymorons and paradoxes. Some fundamental rights, 
such as education, work and divorce, are generally recognized and accepted; there are 
more and more positive examples such as the growing awareness among boys on the 
discrimination suffered by women, but double standards regarding women’s sexuality 
and behaviours persist, along with the internalization of some gender stereotypes 
(Rafatjah 2012). The following lines convey the feelings of Siavash, a 27-year-old young 
man who claims to support the feminism movement:  
 
“There are women who use their bodies to be looked at and gain attention and 
they say no, we do it because we are feminists... well, you live with men in the 
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same city, so if you behave sexily, you are objectifying yourself and you are not a 
feminist”.  
This comment testifies the difficulty in understanding the plurality of meanings and 
shades the concept of feminism assumes and reveals a certain degree of inflexibility to-
wards women’s behaviours. This feeling is stated by Malika, a 28-year-old woman: 
“In Iran, feminist men are considered as gays. Another thing: for many people I 
know, a feminist is a bald, fat woman who does not wash herself, who dresses in 
a masculine way. But it is not so: a woman can be sexy and be a feminist at the 
same time. Feminism means you can decide upon your body”.  
What Malika expresses is the difficulty, reiterated by other female interviewees, to 
make their opinions and thoughts understood by men. Most importantly, she empha-
sizes the increasing weight of sexuality and bodily autonomy as fundamental dimensions 
of feminism and the need to unchain women’s corporeality from dominant patriarchal 
view and from a stereotyped representation of feminism. As Morgana (2018a) claims, in 
fact, the individual and collective resistance of Iranian women has moved over time – 
and especially from the 1990s ─ against the depoliticization of women’s struggles for 
their own bodies and sexuality that lies on the conceptualization of a division between 
the ‘public’ domain of politic and the State and the ‘private’ sphere of the home (Mac-
Cormack and Strathern 1980; Kandiyoti 1991; Norton et al. 1997).  
As said, another belief made upon feminism is not to have a real understanding of 
the women’s situation in Iran or to be inadequate to address women’s problems in the 
country. Such judgement can be linked to the long-lasting diatribe between Western and 
local feminism (Tohidi 2002; Kian-Thiébaut 2012; Mouri and Batmanghelichi 2013) and 
is best exemplified by this man of 29: 
“Our society still has a lot of work to do. We cannot change everything so sud-
denly. A new culture should be built first. If we want to import this wave of femi-
nism without changing women’s law, well, this would create problems”.  
Another participant, Reza, a man of 27, highlighted the gap between the articula-
tion of feminism in Western societies and the situation of Iranian women: 
“I think feminism until the second wave was legitimate, it dealt with women's 
rights in the family and in society. But the third wave, in which for example women 
do not shave their armpits, is a bit too much for me, it is extremism. And it harms 
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the movement. Women who are feminist should fight only for their rights within 
the family and in society and not for their personal, small issues”. 
These last comments highlight the ambivalence that comes with the idea of feminism 
among these actors and specifically among young men. As Moghadam (1993), Paidar 
(2001) and Haeiri (2009) argue, the growing discrimination introduced by the Islamic Re-
public has paradoxically led to an increase of awareness and activism for women’ rights 
among many Iranians despite the great hostility expressed by the conservative majority 
and the official discourse. Nevertheless, for many youths, Iran does not seem ready yet 
for the complete acceptance of feminism that still represents a foreign concept and 
needs further adaptation to be implemented in society. Given that the women’s move-
ment in Iran has, over time, remained predominantly rights oriented and targeted the 
legal system (Tohidi 2016; Sadeghi 2019), most respondents put emphasis on the need 
to reform the jurisprudence; while Malika’s quote stresses the importance of body man-
agement and autonomy, Reza and Siavash’s ones marginalize other, more subtle forms 
of discrimination towards women, for example in the sexual sphere16.  
As these quotes show, the struggle over ‘local’ and ‘global’ feminism and Iranian 
women’s ‘true’ priorities is indeed an evergreen matter of debate both within and out-
side the academia. The followings are two cases raised from the interviews that best 
exemplify the diverse attitudes towards Iranian women’s needs and urgencies and the 
most suitable strategies to achieve them.  
The Me Too campaign, a movement against sexual harassment and assault spread 
mainly in the United States since 2017, has entered the public debate also in Iran, pro-
voking conflicting standpoints. During a meeting in Tehran with some Millennial men 
and women − organized by one of the authors of this paper − two diametrically opposite 
reactions emerged. On the one hand, some individuals declared themselves in favor of 
the movement, arguing that it could have beneficial effects on Iranian society, where 
there is a pervasive ostracism on the issue. On the other hand, other Millennials ex-
pressed skepticism about the campaign, judging it a ‘Western product’ hard to imple-
ment in the Iranian context, where women face different problems and need different 
solutions. Along with the Me Too movement, the football match that took place on Oc-
tober 10, 2019 in Tehran between Iran and Cambodia represents another significant bat-
tleground on the diverse opinions youths hold about women's challenges and their 
 
16 Similarly, Afary (2009) affirms the existence of a persistent attitude among intellectual men, who have 
often opposed limitations of women’s rights in field such as education, employment and citizenship, while 
refusing to address male sexual prerogatives. The field research confirms this behaviour among the young 
men interviewed too, in accordance with Sadeghi and Moruzzi (2006) and Sadeghi (2008). 
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relevance. On this occasion, the ban on Iranian women entering stadiums and watching 
football matches was temporarily lifted following years of activism and international 
pressure. Here too, the opinions collected were divided between those who positively 
welcomed the event as a step forward for women's emancipation, and those who un-
derlined its utter uselessness. Interviewed about the initiative, Samaneh, a 30-year-old 
woman argued that:  
“Actually, this kind of topics sound bigger and more important in the West, be-
cause they want to emphasize that women here have nothing, no rights... but the 
truth is that being allowed to watch this match is not that important in our lives... 
even if I were free to do it, I don't think I would ever go to the stadium... out of 
Iran, everyone tries to highlight that Iranian women are miserable, that their con-
ditions are horrible, that they’re victims of patriarchy... while it is no longer so, 
really, at least in our social class... As an Iranian woman, there is nothing that I 
have not done; indeed, I have also done things that men have never done. I don't 
want to praise the Islamic Republic, the veil is a very important issue, yes, but I do 
the same things that men do.” 
This remark on the misrepresentation of Iranian women in the West is in line with a 
successive comment in which Samaneh criticized the MeToo movement as a form of 
‘white Western’ feminism valid mainly in the European and American context as it fo-
cuses on a topic she considers secondary for herself and Iranian women. To the ‘first 
world problems’ of Hollywood celebrities, she counterposed issues such as unemploy-
ment, political repression and the struggle to make ends meet in the middle of an eco-
nomic crisis. Stressing her ability to do “the same things that men do”, moreover, she 
affirmed the pragmatic and concrete nature of her daily life’s priorities as an Iranian 
woman, which seem to go well beyond the compulsory veil or the stadium ban. 
As these last examples show, the dilemma of the true urgencies for Iranian feminists 
and the women’s movement − that is, whether to remain faithful to issues that primarily 
affect women’s daily lives, such as the family law, or to adopt a broader intersectional 
approach that takes into account additional, multiple forms of discrimination − remains 
open and problematic. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
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The main goal of this paper was to provide evidence that, far from being a monolithic 
category devoid of political and civic engagement or firm on radical and dichotomous 
positions (Westernized and progressive versus traditional and Islamic), Iranian Millenni-
als present a plurality of beliefs and stands about gender and feminism, not without con-
tradictions. If the supposed lack of interest in feminism and political activism among Mil-
lennials is a subject of continual debate within the international literature (Williams and 
Wittig 1997; Myaskovsky and Wittig 1997; Liss, O’Connor, Morosky and Crawford 2001; 
McCabe 2005; Crossley 2017), in Iran this debate presents its own specificities due to 
the particular social and political history of the country. In a generally heteronormative 
and repressive context, most Iranians are not exposed to the intricacies of gender and 
feminism debate or given the opportunity to explore and discuss these issues (Rahbari 
2019). The recent protests against the mandatory veil, moreover, have awakened an 
ever-dulled anxiety on the part of Western commentators to identify new feminist icons. 
However, caution should be exercised in hastily affixing labels without considering the 
complex dynamics of the Iranian society and its transformations.  
The paper aimed at highlighting the ambivalences and contradiction inherent in the 
representations and narratives of Iranian youths regarding controversial and complex 
issues such as gender roles and power dynamics. Young Iranians born in the 1990s have 
often been accused of lack of interest in social and political issues, laziness, idleness and 
passivity. Raised in the so-called Reconstruction Era, they have not experienced major 
upheavals like the 1999 and 2009 riots and their understanding of activism has assumed 
shapes and meanings different from the previous generations (Morgana 2018b; Risman 
2018). Partially rejecting these pessimistic interpretations, the field research showed the 
more tolerant and open attitude of these youths towards gender issues and women's 
rights and their innovative role within the new frame of political participation. Such lively 
gender debates and confrontation did not exist in the early years of the Islamic Republic, 
nor during the previous regime (Tohidi 2002). In their struggles for women’s rights, Mil-
lennials have developed new, inedited strategies that include increasingly new techno-
logical and communication tools: more educated and techno-savvy than the previous 
generations, today’s middle-class Millennials have ideals and behaviours that are signif-
icantly dissimilar from other Iranians (Kurzman 2008). If these strategies and approaches 
are different from the traditional ones, they are not necessarily less effective (Sadeghi 
2010; Bayat 2017).  
Compared to older generations and their peers from different social classes and rural 
contexts, middle-class Millennials of Tehran enjoy several economic and social privi-
leges, like the generally higher level of education and exposure to global models and 
influences. Nevertheless, their accounts disclose numerous ambivalences that mirror 
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the complex and multifaceted relation with the West and the power dynamics within 
Iranian society. The negative stereotypes associated with feminism as a result of the 
government backlash are alive and well today and help to clarify why youths are often 
cautious of the feminist label, even when they espouse egalitarian values. In accordance 
with international literature, the number of youths who openly share opinions about 
feminism or declare him/herself a feminist is certainly on the rise, but the tag is still 
viewed with a certain suspicion due to a combination of different factors such as the lack 
of a proper public debate and a conceptual clarity within the society, the fragmented 
nature of the women’s movement, the persistence of stereotyped gender representa-
tions and roles and youths’ new approach to politics and activism. More and more 
youths are becoming gender-conscious; at the same time, they are trying to de-couple 
their identity from collective labels and affiliations to individual definitions based on 
their own preferences and attitudes (Mahdi 2004; Morgana 2018b).  
The empirical findings also indicate that a gender gap persists relative to identifica-
tion with feminism, as the harshest criticisms are those from men (Kurzman 2008; 
Maurer 2016). While all interviewees declared themselves in favor of gender equality, 
this statement remains ambiguous and vague as the in-depth analysis of their words re-
vealed double standards of judgment, the existence of many misunderstandings (“femi-
nism means the dominance of women over men”) and a certain resistance to net 
changes in gender relations and roles (“women who do not shave their armpits, is too 
much for me”).  
It seems that while feminism as a set of abstract values and dispositions is generally 
acknowledged and accepted, feminism as a social identity and movement is still subject 
of unsolved misinterpretations and critics, similarly to what a number of scholars (Ren-
zetti 1987; Griffin 1989; Kamen 1991; Cowan, Mestlin and Masek 1992; Henderson-King 
and Stewart 1994; Buschman and Lenart 1996) have shown for other, Western contexts 
too. 
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